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Legal Notes
Harold Dudley Greeley, Editor
This section is not, strictly, a new departure for The Journal, but it will be
sufficiently unlike its predecessors to warrant at least a brief statement of its
objectives. In the first place, it will be a selective news service. It must be
selective, because even the briefest comment on every current decision or stat
ute which might reasonably be of interest to accountants somewhere in the
country would require much more space than properly could be allotted to it.
In the selection of material, the major effort will be to find those matters of the
broadest interest and the widest appeal. One decision of that character is dis
cussed in this issue. Then will come matters of law not related directly to the
practice of accountancy but important because they affect subjects of law in
which the accountant may be expected to uncover questions in the course of
audits or investigations. Several items of this nature are presented in this first
instalment. Now and then matters of lesser import but still thought likely to
be of interest will be mentioned. Even an oddity may be pointed out on rare
occasions, when, for example, a court in all seriousness writes, “The decision
of the court in this case is grounded in the belief that the future possibility in
dicated in the Van Vechten case has fructified into a prognosticated frumentary.” DeLong v. Mass. F. & M. Ins. Co., 256 N. Y. S. 300, 303. Decisions in
tax cases may be discussed rarely, because such highly technical topics can
be treated adequately only in a tax service.
Beginning on the first of January, 1933, reports covering all of the states
in this country and several other English-speaking countries will be scanned
regularly for items of interest. Readers are urged to call the attention of
The Journal to any statute or decision which they may regard as significant
and, if space permits, their contributions will be noted. In all cases, however,
a decision must be identified by a citation of the report in which it is printed or
a state statute must be described by giving the name of the state, the date of
the legislative session and the number of the chapter or title of the act in which
it is to be found. Nothing will be printed without an exact reference which
will enable any reader to study the statute or decision in its original form.
WHEN IS AN INSTRUMENT SEALED?

Among decisions of lesser general importance is one by the appellate division
of the New York supreme court, which is next to the highest court in that
state. It was held that the letters L.S. after the signature of a party to an
instrument not required by law to be under seal are not alone sufficient to con
stitute the instrument a sealed one. To raise the presumption that an instru
ment is sealed although no seal actually appears on it, there must be some
recognition of the seal in the instrument itself, such as “witness my hand and
seal ” or “ signed and sealed.” If a document executed by a corporation through
its ostensible officers contains no internal evidence to show the fact of sealing,
or that the corporate seal was impressed, or that it was in fact the corporate
seal which appeared on it, the presumption arises that the instrument was not
uttered, to speak technically, by the corporation as its sealed obligation. In
such cases, the character of the document becomes a question of fact for the
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jury or the court as the situation may require.
259 N. Y. S. 601).

(Drexler-Rocherter v. Paris,

FIRE INSURANCE BY LIFE-TENANT

The troublesome matter of insurance on property held for a life-tenant and a
remainderman recently arose before the supreme court of Mississippi. A life
tenant in possession had insured the trust property and had paid the premiums
out of his own funds. Some $10,000 were collected after a loss but neither the
value of the property nor the actuarial value of the life estate was disclosed to
the court. The point at issue was whether the life-tenant could keep the entire
proceeds or must account to the remainderman. The court held that fire in
surance is an indemnity to the insured and that the proceeds did not run with
the land nor were they to be treated as taking the place of the property insured.
The life-tenant and the remainderman each had a right to insure his own inter
est in the property, no duty to insure for the benefit of the remainderman was
imposed on the life-tenant, and the life-tenant was held entitled to keep the
entire proceeds of the insurance (King v. King, 143 Southern Rep. 422). The
courts of other states have held that the life-tenant in those circumstances may
retain out of the proceeds only the value of his life estate.
EVASION OF USURY

In times of economic disturbance, usury frequently becomes a topic of
major interest. Recently the New York supreme court had occasion to rule
upon an attempt to conceal usury through the device of incorporating the
borrower, the New York law denying to a corporation the right to plead usury
as a defence (General Business Law, Sec. 374). A mortgagee, after agreeing to
renew a mortgage on payment of a sum in addition to legal interest, required
the organization of a corporation to make the extension agreement. The court
held that this was merely a subterfuge and that the transaction was usurious.
The lender had failed to “invoke the finesse of the usurer.” He should have
refused the extension until the borrower had been incorporated and as a cor
poration had applied for it. “The difference is in the way the lender ap
proached the deal. ... It seems that the teeth have been extracted from the
usury laws. Only the uninitiated fail to escape their requirements.” (Sherling v. Gallatin Improvement Co., Inc., 260 N. Y. S. 229).
AN AUDITOR’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE IRREGULARITY

Canadian Woodmen v. Hooper, et al. (41 Ontario Weekly Notes 328) is one
of two pending cases in our neighboring country which directly involve the work
of accountants. The Canadian Woodmen of the World is an incorporated
fraternal order, of which one Hooper was the chief executive officer. In July,
1927, the directors of the corporation decided to invest about $10,000 in the
purchase of certain railway bonds and it became Hooper’s duty to buy them.
He paid the purchase price to a broker named Clarke, but instead of the rail
way bonds he accepted other bonds because Clarke said that the former had to
be procured from England. This was intended to be a temporary arrange
ment and Clarke promised Hooper to deliver the railway bonds promptly.
Hooper not only failed to report what he had done but he made false entries in
the corporation’s books to show that the investment in the railway bonds had
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been made. Those bonds were never received, but Hooper continued the de
ception by crediting the interest on the other bonds as if it were interest on the
railway bonds.
The other defendants were public accountants who made an audit of the
corporate books in January, 1928. They discovered these facts but did not
report them because Hooper promised to have the matter “ put right ” and be
cause Clarke promised to deliver the railway bonds. Audit reports by these
defendants for 1927, 1928 and 1929, showed the railway bonds as an investment
and each report contained a certificate that “the bonds, debentures and mort
gages have been examined by us and are according to the list annexed hereto.”
When the audit report for 1930 was ready for delivery the auditors disclosed all
of these facts to the president of the corporation who then learned of them for
the first time.
The Canadian Woodmen immediately sued Hooper and the firm of ac
countants for damages. The lower court gave judgment to the plaintiff for the
market value of the railway bonds as of the date of the trial but directed that
upon payment of this judgment ($8,840.32) the other bonds actually received
by Hooper were to be turned over to the defendants. Both Hooper and the
accountants appealed to the court of appeal.
Hooper’s contention on appeal was that he was not negligent and that the
loss was attributable solely to Clarke’s failure to make delivery. The court of
appeal made short shrift of this argument and held that no question of negli
gence was involved but that Hooper had committed a breach of duty of which
the loss was the direct result. The accountants’ appeal was on the ground
chiefly that they were not negligent as auditors, but that if they were negligent
their negligence was not the cause of plaintiff’s loss.
The court of appeal paid little more attention to the accountants’ contention
than it did to Hooper’s. It held that their liability did not depend upon
negligence but was based upon a positive act of misconduct in not reporting the
irregularity when they first discovered it. They were not responsible for a
loss flowing from misconduct by Hooper or from Clarke’s failure to deliver but
they were responsible for any loss which could have been prevented by their
reporting the true state of facts at the time they acquired the information, and
the court sent the matter to the master of the court (corresponding to a referee)
to report on the amount of this loss.
An appeal was taken by the accountants to the supreme court of Canada.
Late in November, 1932, an application made by them and an insurance com
pany for approval of a bond as security upon the appeal was granted by a judge
of the court of appeal (41 Ontario Weekly Notes 409). If the supreme court
grants the right to appeal, hears the argument and renders a decision which is
reported, comment will be made on it in these notes.
Another case, much more interesting, is now wending its way through the
Canadian courts but comment on it will be reserved until the official report of
it has been seen. This is International Laboratories, Ltd. v. Dewar, et al, 3
Western Weekly Reports 174, which involves the liability of an auditor for a
substantial defalcation by an employee of the client, when the client had so
limited the scope of the audit (in order to reduce the auditing cost) as to make
detection difficult if not impossible. This citation was received too late for
comment now but the case will be discussed in our February issue.
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